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a b s t r a c t
The impulsive preference of an animal for an immediate reward implies that itmight subjectively discount
the value of potential future outcomes. A theoretical framework to maximize the discounted subjective
value has been established in the reinforcement learning theory. The framework has been successfully
applied in engineering. However, this study identified a limitation when applied to animal behavior,
where in some cases, there is no learning goal. Here a possible learning framework was proposed that
is well-posed in any cases and that is consistent with the impulsive preference.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Animals often prefer a small reward given immediately to a
large reward given later, even though they receive a less total
amount of rewards (Ainslie, 1974; Mazur & Biondi, 2009; Richards,
Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997; Schultz, 2010). The preference
observed in inter-temporal choices of rewards suggests that an
animal might subjectively discount the value of a delayed reward
and attempt to maximize the discounted subjective value (Becker
&Murphy, 1988). The nature of delay discounting has been studied
in various fields both experimentally (Ainslie, 1974; Mazur &
Biondi, 2009; Richards et al., 1997; Schultz, 2010) and theoretically
(Nakahara & Kaveri, 2010; Sozou, 1998; Takahashi, 2005), and has
often been discussed in relation to impulsivity or addiction (Kim &
Lee, 2011; Takahashi, 2011).
A theoretical framework tomaximize the discounted subjective
value is formulated in the reinforcement learning theory, which
deals with the learning of action choosing for a given situation
(Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998). The framework
is constructed as follows: Assume a discrete time step t , and a
subject that is required to choose an action at from the available
options at each step and that is given a reward of amount rt+1 at
the next time step t + 1. Let the state variable st represent a given
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.situation at a time step t . Note that the temporal order of the states,
actions, and rewards in this notation is st , at , rt+1, st+1, at+1, . . . .
In the learning system, an action is chosen with a conditional
probability for a given state st : pas ≡ P(at = a|st = s). The set
of state-dependent choice probabilities {pas} is optimized through
trial-and-error learning. The learning goal depends on the learning
problem. The ‘‘discounted problem’’ (Bertsekas, 1995; Bertsekas
& Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) is to find a set {pas}
that maximizes the temporally discounted subjective values for all
states, each of which is defined as
Vs ≡ E
 ∞
k=1
γ krt+k
 st = s

, (1)
where E[ · | · ] denotes the conditional expected value, and the
discount factor γ represents the extent of the discount, 0 ≤ γ < 1.
Multiple state-values VA, VB, . . . exist for their respective
states s = A, B, . . . . Each state-value Vs depends on the choice
made in another state s′ visited after st = s, and hence, each
state-value cannot be maximized independently of other state-
values. The ‘‘discounted problem’’ is, so to speak, an optimization
problem for multiple objective functions. A solution to such an
optimization problemdoes not generally exist, since a solution that
maximizes one function does not necessarily maximize another.
However, a solution to the ‘‘discounted problem’’ does exist
under the condition of the Markov decision process (Bertsekas,
1995; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996), which is usually presupposed
in standard frameworks. This framework for the ‘‘discounted
problem’’ has provided many practical algorithms for engineering
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be consistent with the activities of dopamine neurons (Schultz,
Dayan, &Montague, 1997), and has been used for themodel-based
analyses of neural activity (O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley,
& Dolan, 2003; Tanaka et al., 2004). However, there is a need to
reconsider whether this is a suitable framework for the modeling
of animal learning.
In a natural situation, animals are not explicitly given a current
state st , and must therefore assess the current situation for
themselves from available information that consists of sensory
stimuli and their history. Different individuals may assess the
current state in different ways. The definition of the state st
depends on the individual and occasion. The condition of the
Markov decision process depends on the definition of the state
st ; hence, it may not hold for a certain state definition. This poses
the question of whether there exists a solution to the ‘‘discounted
problem’’ for an arbitrary state-definition. In the next section,
we demonstrated examples in which there is no solution to the
‘‘discounted problem’’ for some state-definitions in simple choice
tasks.
2. No solution to the ‘‘discounted problem’’
Consider a simple choice task that is iterated successively
(see Fig. 1(a)). At each time step t , a subject is given one of
two sensory cues, ct = A or B, and is required to choose one
of two responses, at = L or R. After that, an identical reward is
stochastically given, rt+1 = 1 or 0, at the beginning of the next
time step. Information available to the subject before the choice
at trial t consists of the history of sensory cues, past rewards, and
responses, {ct , rt , at−1, ct−1, . . .}. A naive definition of the state st
is the current sensory cue, st ≡ ct . If the learning system uses the
sensory cue ct as the state st and makes a state-dependent choice,
P(at = L|ct = A) = 1− P(at = R|ct = A) = pLA,
P(at = L|ct = B) = 1− P(at = R|ct = B) = pLB,
the learning system attempts to find a set (pLA, pLB) to maximize
both thediscounted state-valuesVA andVB to solve the ‘‘discounted
problem’’. Fig. 1(b) shows VA and VB as functions of (pLA, pLB) for an
example set of task parameters in which the reward probability
was determined by a combination of the sensory cue and the
response, and inwhich the sensory cuewas determined by the two
steps previous response,
P(rt+1 = 1) =

0.9 (ct = A and at = L)
0.1 (otherwise),
ct =

A (at−2 = R)
B (at−2 = L).
(2)
It is clear that both VA and VB are simultaneously maximized at a
point (pLA, pLB) for any value of the discount factor γ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6
and 0.8 (rows of plots). Thus, there is a solution to the ‘‘discounted
problem’’. The ‘‘discounted problem’’ is well-posed in these cases.
In contrast, if the learning system uses the response chosen at
the previous time step as the state, st ≡ at−1, and makes a choice
independent of the cue being given currently,
P(at = L|at−1 = L) = 1− P(at = R|at−1 = L) = pLL,
P(at = L|at−1 = R) = 1− P(at = R|at−1 = R) = pLR,
the values VL and VR are maximized at different points of (pLL, pLR)
respectively, for any value of the discount factor γ = 0.2, 0.4,
0.6 and 0.8 (Fig. 1(c)). The set (pLL, pLR) maximizing VL does not
maximize VR, and therefore, there is no solution to the ‘‘discounted
problem’’. The ‘‘discounted problem’’ is ill-posed in these cases.
For another set of task parameters in which the reward prob-
ability was determined by a combination of the two consecutivechoices, and in which the sensory cue was randomly selected with
probability
P(rt+1 = 1) =

0.9 (at−1 = R and at = L)
0.1 (otherwise),
P(ct = A) = 0.6,
(3)
there is no solution to the ‘‘discounted problem’’ for the state
definition st ≡ ct (Fig. 1(d)), while there is a solution for the
state definition st ≡ at−1 (Fig. 1(e)). Even in inter-temporal choice
situations, there is no solution to the ‘‘discounted problem’’ for
some state definitions (Supplementary Figure).
Animals actually receive high-dimensional sensory inputs.
Hence, the state can be defined in many ways. State-definition,
which depends on the individuals, cannot be determined using
only the external environment. Since the ‘‘discounted problem’’ is
defined in a manner that depends on each state-definition, there
must exist a learning goal for each state-definition. These results
show that there is no learning goal for some state-definitions.
When an animal adopts such a state-definition, does the animal
actually lose the goal of the learning? Is there any possibility that
an animal attempts to solve another learning problem well-posed
for any state definition? In thenext section,wepropose an example
of the learning problem in which a solution always exists for an
arbitrary state definition.
3. Event-timing value problem
The defect in the ‘‘discounted problem’’ arises in the existence
of multiple values to be maximized. Hence, an answer would be to
define a single value to be maximized.
A naive suggestion for such a value would be the average of the
discounted state-values over all states,

s VsP(s), where P(s) is
the probability distribution of the state s. However, this value is
proportional to the average reward,
s
VsP(s) = E
 ∞
k=1
γ krt+k

= γ
1− γ E [r] .
The maximization of the average state-value is equivalent to
the maximization of the average reward, which is inconsistent
with the inter-temporal choice behavior of animals. The above
transformation is supported by the constant discount factor γ .
If event-based time steps are introduced into the framework
instead of regular time steps, as formulated in the semi-Markov
decision process (Bertsekas, 1995; Daw, Courville, & Touretzky,
2006; Sutton&Barto, 1998), and if the discount factor γ is assumed
to be a function of the inter-event interval τt from the (t − 1)-th
event to the t-th event, then the average discounted value
U ≡ E
 ∞
k=1

k
j=1
γ (τt+j)

rt+k

, (4)
can not generally be factorized into

k E

j γ (τt+j)

E [rt+k];
hence, the maximization of U generally deviates from the average
reward maximization (e.g., Supplementary Figure). They both
coincide only if inter-event intervals {τj} and rewards {rk} are
independent.
The type of event that results in the progression of a time step
is subjective. Although there may exist multiple types of events,
the definition (4) is the average over all types of events. Therefore,
the value to be maximized is single, and there is always a solution
to maximize U . The maximization problem of U is always well-
posed. Here the valueU defined by Eq. (4) is called as ‘‘event-timing
value’’, and the maximization problem is called as ‘‘event-timing
value problem’’.
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Fig. 1. Discounted state values are not simultaneously maximized for some state-definitions. (a) An example of the time steps of the choice task used for the calculation
of the discounted state values (b–e). In this illustration, the sensory cue is presented as a specific background color, and the available options are the left and right buttons.
The cue presentation and the reward delivery obey a stochastic rule of two different patterns: Eq. (2) for (b,c) and Eq. (3) for (d,e). (b–e) Discounted state values are shown
with pseudo color as the functions of the state-dependent choice probabilities for different state-definitions using the two patterns of the task parameters. The pseudo color
is normalized in the range from V = 0 to the maximum in each plot. The scale bar is common to all plots, shown at the bottom right of (e). The plots in the left column
of each figure show the state-value VA for (b,d) and VL for (c,d). The plots in the right columns show the state-value VB for (b,d) and VR for (c,e). The plots in different rows
correspond to different values of the discount factor: 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8.The event-timing value (Eq. (4)) can bewritten in another form,
U = E

rt
∞
k=0
k
j=0
γ (τt−j)

≡ E [rtΓt ] , (5)
where the stochastic variable Γt ≡∞k=0kj=0 γ (τt−j) holds a
recurrence formula Γt = γ (τt)(1+ Γt−1), and can be easily
calculated online. Thus, the event-timing value problem results
in the maximization of the subjective reward rtΓt . Therefore, the
learning for the event-timing value problem can be achieved by the
standard frameworks of the average reward maximization (Daw
et al., 2006; Tsitsiklis & Van Roy, 2002; Williams, 1992), only by
substituting the subjective reward rtΓt for the reward rt .
The maximization of the event-timing value U reproduces the
inter-temporal choice behavior of an animal for a certain function
γ (τ). In a standard inter-temporal choice task, each response a is
associated with a reward of certain delay Da and amount Ra. If the
events consist of only the onset of the start cue (tcue), the response
timing (tres), and the reward timing (trwd), then the respective
inter-event intervals when the response a is always chosen are
τtcue = L− Da, τtres = RT and τtrwd = Da, where RT denotes the
response time from the start cue, which is assumed here to be
independent from the past event series, and L denotes the total
time from a choice response to the start cue of the next trial that
was fixed in standard inter-temporal choice tasks (Mazur & Biondi,2009; Richards et al., 1997). By using the recurrence formula,
E[Γtrwd ] = γ (Da)(1 + E[Γtres ]) = γ (Da)(1 + E[γ (RT ])(1 +
E[Γtcue ])) = γ (Da)(1 + E[γ (RT ])(1 + γ (L − Da)(1 + E[Γtrwd ]))).
Solving this equation for E[Γtrwd ], the event timing value U when
the response a is always chosen was calculated as
U = 1
3

E[0× Γtcue ] + E[0× Γtres ] + E[RaΓtrwd ]

= Raγ (Da)(1+ E[γ (RT )](1+ γ (L− Da)))
3(1− γ (Da)E[γ (RT )]γ (L− Da)) . (6)
For sufficiently small γ (L− Da) ≃ 0, the event timing value U ≃
Raγ (Da)(1 + E[γ (RT )])/3 ∝ Raγ (Da) approximately. This form
coincides with the standard delay discounting form (Mazur &
Biondi, 2009; Richards et al., 1997; Schultz, 2010; Takahashi, 2011),
inwhich the delay discounting function estimated from behavioral
data can be fitted successfully by using the near hyperbolic
function γ (D) ≃ (1+ κD)−1. In fact, the dependence of the event-
timing value (6) on the delay D approximately coincides with
the function γ (D),U(D)/U(0) ≃ γ (D), when the function γ (D)
was set as (1 + κD)−1 and the parameter values were set as
those obtained in the experiment by Mazur and Biondi (2009)
(Fig. 2). Thus, the maximization of the event-timing value U is
consistent with the impulsive preference of animals observed in
inter-temporal choice tasks.
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a function of the reward delay D (solid lines) in comparison to the discounting
function γ (D) = (1+κD)−1 (dashed lines). The response timewas set as a constant
RT = 0.02L. The parameter values κL = 7 and 32 correspond to those fitted to the
behaviors of pigeons and rats respectively, in the experiment by Mazur and Biondi
(2009), in which the trial length L = 50 s.
4. Conclusion
It was found that there is no solution to the standard
reinforcement learning problem: ‘‘discounted problem’’ (Bertsekas
& Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) for certain state-
definitions (Fig. 1). Such state-definitions may be out of the scope
of the current reinforcement learning theory, but plausible for
animals. Here, a learning problem: ‘‘event-timing value problem’’
was proposed (Eq. (4)) to provide a subjective value that is well-
posed for an arbitrary state-definition and consistent with inter-
temporal choice behavior observed in animals (Fig. 2).
5. Discussion
Animals must use one of a number of ways to define
state, because they are not explicitly given the current state as
presupposed in reinforcement learning theory. The adoption of a
certain state-definition restricts choice behavior from all possible
response sequences. If the state-definition is inappropriate for
the given environment, the truly maximum outcome cannot be
generally obtained. The truly maximum outcome is obtained
for a state-definition on which the condition of the Markov
decision process is satisfied (Sakai & Fukai, 2008). The ‘‘discounted
problem’’ is well-posed under the condition (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis,
1996). It is not necessary in engineering to establish the learning
problem for an inappropriate state-definition.
However, an animal may adopt an inappropriate state-
definition. Is the learning goal for an animal actually lost when
an inappropriate state-definition is adopted? Do unstable choice
behaviors sometimes observed (Yoshida & Ishii, 2006) imply the
loss of goal? Otherwise, there may be still some subjective goal
for the individual to attempt to achieve. We proposed a possible
framework ‘‘event-timing value problem’’ in which the learning
goal is not lost for arbitrary state-definition. As event timings are
subjective, it is difficult to test the validity of the event-timing
value directly. However, it can be tested implicitly by observing
how additional external events change the preferences of animals.
The key factor in the definition of the event-timing value is
the introduction of event-based time steps and the physical-time-
dependent discounting. This combination is common to the dis-
counted problem in the semi-Markov decision process (Bertsekas,
1995; Sutton & Barto, 1998). There are other frameworks using
event-dissected time steps and a constant discount factor inde-
pendent from inter-event intervals (Nakahara & Kaveri, 2010).
Although the possible origins of the discounting function γ (τ)
were not highlighted in this study, an online estimation method
(temporal difference learning) to approximate the hyperbolic dis-
counting was proposed (Alexander & Brown, 2010), and rela-
tions between the subjective time perception and the hyperbolicdiscounting are discussed (Nakahara & Kaveri, 2010; Takahashi,
2005). In addition to the above mentioned previous studies, the
event-timing value problem also provides a framework to discuss
the nature of subjective time for decision and discounting.
Here we presupposed that the impulsive preference of an
animal may be a result of the subjective value maximization.
However, there is another interpretation. The impulsive preference
can be reproduced as a result of a robust transient of the reward
maximization using the temporal difference learning (Daw &
Touretzky, 2000). The subjective valuemaximization is only one of
several possibilities. Moreover, the event-timing value is only one
possible subjective value. The defect in the standard reinforcement
learning problem highlighted in this study shows the need for
establishing a framework for reinforcement learning suitable for
animals exhibiting impulsivity.
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